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Abstract. Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) Codes detect ad-
versarial noise that is added to a coded message which is stored in a
storage that is opaque to the adversary. We study AMD codes when
the storage can leak up to ρ log |G| bits of information about the stored
codeword, where G is the group that contains the codeword and ρ is a
constant. We propose ρ-AMD codes that provide protection in this new
setting. We define weak and strong ρ-AMD codes that provide security
for a random and an arbitrary message, respectively. We derive concrete
and asymptotic bounds for the efficiency of these codes featuring a rate
upper bound of 1 − ρ for the strong codes. We also define the class of
ρLV -AMD codes that provide protection when leakage is in the form of
a number of codeword components, and give constructions featuring a
family of strong ρLV -AMD codes that asymptotically achieve the rate
1 − ρ. We describe applications of ρ-AMD codes to, (i) robust ramp
secret sharing scheme and, (ii) wiretap II channel when the adversary
can eavesdrop a ρ fraction of codeword components and tamper with all
components of the codeword.
1 Introduction
Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) Codes [1] protect messages against
additive adversarial tampering, assuming the codeword cannot be “seen” by
the adversary. In AMD codes, a message is encoded to a codeword that is an
element of a publicly known group G. The codeword is stored in a private storage
which is perfectly opaque to the adversary. The adversary however can add an
arbitrary element of G to the storage to make the decoder output a different
message. A δ-secure AMD code guarantees that any such manipulation succeeds
with probability at most δ. Security of AMD codes has been defined for “weak”
and “strong” codes: weak codes provide security assuming message distribution
is uniform, while strong codes guarantee security for any message distribution.
Weak AMD codes are primarily deterministic codes and security relies on the
randomness of the message space. Strong AMD codes are randomized codes
and provide security for any message. AMD codes have wide applications as a
building block of cryptographic primitives such as robust information dispersal
[1], and anonymous message transmission [1], and have been used to provide a
ar
X
iv
:1
60
7.
00
08
9v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  7
 Ju
l 2
01
6
2 Fuchun Lin, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, Pengwei Wang
generic construction for robust secret sharing schemes from linear secret sharing
schemes [1].
AMD codes with leakage were first considered in [2] where the leakage was
defined for specific parts of the encoding process. An α-weak AMD code with
linear leakage, also called α-weak LLR-AMD code, is a deterministic code that
guarantees security when part of the message is leaked but the min-entropy of
the message space is at least 1 − α fraction of the message length (in bits).
An α-strong LLR-AMD is a randomized code that guarantees security when
the randomness of encoding, although partially leaked, has at least min-entropy
(1− α) log |R| where R is the randomness set of encoding.
In this paper we consider leakage from the storage that holds the codeword.
This effectively relaxes the original model of AMD codes that required the code-
word to be perfectly private. As we will show this model turns out to be more
challenging compared to LLR-AMD models where the leakage is in a more re-
stricted part in the encoding process.
A more detailed relation between our model and LLR-AMD models is given
in Section 3.1.
Our work
We define ρ-Algebraic Manipulation Detection (ρ-AMD ) codes as an extension
of AMD codes when the storage that holds the codeword (an element of G),
leaks up to ρ log |G| bits of information about the codeword. We assume the ad-
versary can apply an arbitrary function to the storage and receive up to ρ log |G|
bits of information about the codeword. Similar to the original AMD codes, we
define weak and strong ρ-AMD codes as deterministic and randomized codes
that guarantee security for a uniformly distributed message and any message,
respectively.
Efficiency of ρ-AMD codes is defined concretely (similar to [1]) and asymp-
totically (using the rate of the code family, which is the asymptotic ratio of the
message length to the codeword length, as the message length approaches infin-
ity ). We prove concrete bounds for both strong and weak ρ-AMD codes and
a non-trivial upper bound 1 − ρ on the rate of the strong ρ-AMD codes. Com-
parison of bounds for different models of AMD codes is summarized in Table
1.
For construction, we use the relationship between ρ-AMD codes and LLR-
AMD codes, to construct (non-optimal) ρ-AMD codes, and leave the construc-
tion of rate optimal ρ-AMD codes as an interesting open problem. We however
define a special type of leakage in which leakage is specified by the number
of codeword components that the adversary can select for eavesdropping. The
model is called limited-view ρ-AMD (ρLV -AMD ). The ρLV -AMD adversary is
allowed to select a fraction ρ of the codeword components, and select their tam-
pering (offset) vector after seeing the values of the chosen components. This
definition of limited-view adversary was first used in [3] where the writing power
of the adversary was also parametrized. We give an explicit construction of strong
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codes concrete bound rate bound
strong AMD G ≥ M−1
δ2
+ 1 1
strong ρ-AMD G1−ρ ≥ M−1
δ2
+ 1 1− ρ
α-strong LLR-AMD G ≥ (M−1)(1−e−1)
δ
2
1−α
+ 1 1
weak AMD G ≥ M−1
δ
+ 1 1
weak ρ-AMD G ≥ M−1
δ
+ 1 and M ≥ Gρ
δ
1
α-weak LLR-AMD G ≥ (M−1)(1−e−1)
δ
1
1−α
+ 1 and G ≥ Mα(M−1)(1−e−1)
δ
+ 1 1
1+α
Table 1. G denotes the size of the group G that codewords live in and M denotes
the size of the message set M. δ is the security parameter.
ρLV -AMD codes that achieve rate 1 − ρ, using an AMD code and a wiretap II
code as building blocks. We note that this rate is achievable for large constant
size alphabets, if we allow a seeded encoder involving a universal hash family (see
[15]). That is the alphabet size depends on the closeness to the actual capacity
value. Also we do not know if 1 − ρ is the capacity of strong ρLV -AMD codes.
Finding the capacity of strong ρLV -AMD codes however is an open question
as the type of leakage (component wise) is more restricted than strong ρ-AMD
codes. We also construct a family of weak ρLV -AMD codes that achieve rate 1
for any leakage parameter ρ.
We consider two applications. The first application can be seen as parallel to
the application of the original AMD codes to robust secret sharing scheme. The
second application is a new variation of active adversary wiretap channel II.
Robust ramp secret sharing scheme. A (t, r,N)-ramp secret sharing scheme
[7,13] is a secret sharing scheme with two thresholds, t and r, such that any t
or less shares do not leak any information about the secret while any r or more
shares reconstruct the secret and if the number a of shares is in between t and
r, an a−tr−t fraction of information of the secret will be leaked. We define a robust
ramp secret sharing scheme as a ramp secret sharing scheme with an additional
(ρ, δ)-robustness property which requires that the probability of reconstructing
a wrong secret, if up to t+bρ(r−t)c shares are controlled by an active adversary,
is bounded by δ. Here ρ is a constant. We will show that a (t, r,N, ρ, δ)-robust
secret sharing scheme can be constructed from a linear (t, r,N)-ramp secret
sharing scheme, by first encoding the message using a ρ-AMD code with security
parameter δ, and then using the linear ramp secret sharing scheme to generate
shares.
Wiretap II with an algebraic manipulation adversary. Wiretap model of
communication was proposed by Wyner [4]. In wiretap II setting [5], the goal is to
provide secrecy against a passive adversary who can adaptively select a fraction
ρ of transmitted codeword components to eavesdrop. We consider active wire-
tap II adversaries that in addition to eavesdropping the channel, algebraically
manipulate the communication by adding a noise (offset) vector to the sent code-
word. The code must protect against eavesdropping and also detect tampering.
An algebraic manipulation wiretap II code is a wiretap II code with security
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against an eavesdropping adversary and so the rate upper bound for wiretap
II codes is applicable. Our construction of ρLV -AMD codes gives a family of
algebraic manipulation wiretap II codes which achieve this rate upper bound
and so the construction is capacity-achieving. The result effectively shows that
algebraic manipulation detection in this case can be achieved for “free” (without
rate loss), asymptotically
Table 2 summarizes the code constructions and applications.
codes constructed asymptotic rate applications
strong ρ-AMD N.A. (ρ, δ)-robust ramp secret sharing
strong ρLV -AMD 1− ρ (ρ, 0, δ)-algebraic adversary wiretap II
weak ρ-AMD N.A. N.A.
weak ρLV -AMD 1 N.A.
Table 2. Summary of codes constructed in this paper and their applications.
Related works
Related works. AMD codes were proposed in [1] and have found numerous
applications. A work directly comparable to ours is [2] where LLR-AMD code
with different leakage models for weak and strong codes are introduced. Our
leakage model uses a single leakage model for both weak and strong codes and
is a natural generalization of the original AMD codes. The relation between our
model and LLR-AMD codes is given in Section 3.1. More generally, there is a
large body of work on modelling leakage and designing leakage resilient systems.
A survey can be found in [6].
Ramp secret sharing schemes (ramp SSS) are introduced in [7]. Robust secret
sharing schemes (robust SSS) are well studied (see for example [1]). To our
knowledge robust ramp secret sharing schemes (robust ramp SSS) have not been
considered before. In a robust SSS, robustness is defined only when the number
of the compromised players is below the privacy threshold of the underling SSS.
Our definition of robust ramp SSS has robustness guarantee even when the
number of compromised players is bigger than the privacy threshold.
Wiretap II model with active adversary was first studied in [14], where the
eavesdropped components and tampered components are restricted to be the
same set. A general model of wiretap II adversaries with additive manipulation
was defined in [8]. In this model (called adversarial wiretap or AWTP) the ad-
versary can read a fraction ρr, and add noise to a fraction ρw, of the codeword
components. The goal of the encoding scheme is to provide secrecy and guaran-
tee reliability (message recovery) against this adversary. A variation of AWTP
called eAWTP is studied in [15], where erasure of codeword components instead
of additive tampering is considered. Interestingly, both AWTP and eAWTP have
the same capacity 1− ρr − ρw. The alphabet of known capacity-achieving codes
Detecting Algebraic Manipulation in Leaky Storage Systems 5
are, O( 1ξ4
1
ξ2 ) for AWTP codes and O(2 1ξ2 ) for eAWTP codes, respectively, where
ξ is the difference of the actual rate and capacity [15]. The adversary of algebraic
manipulation wiretap II codes defined in this paper can be seen as the AWTP
adversary with ρr = ρ and ρw = 1, yielding 1−ρr−ρw < 0. In this case recover-
ing the message is impossible. Our results on algebraic manipulation wiretap II
show that a weaker goal against active attack, that is to detect manipulation of
the message, is achievable and can be achieved with capacity 1− ρ, which is the
same as the capacity of wiretap II codes with no security against active attacks.
Organization: In Section 2, we give notations and introduce AMD codes (with/
without leakage) and wiretap II codes. In Section 3, we define ρ-AMD codes
and derive efficiency bounds. In Section 4, we study ρLV -AMD codes and give
concrete constructions. In Section 5, we give two applications.
2 Preliminaries
Calligraphy letters X denote sets and their corresponding capital letters denote
the cardinality, |X | = X. Boldface letters x denote vectors. x|S denotes the
sub-vector of x consisting of the components specified by the index set S. [n]
denotes {1, 2, · · · , n}. Capital boldface letters X denote random variables, and
X← X denotes sampling of the random variable X from the set X , with X $← X
denoting a uniform distribution in sampling. The statistical distance between X
and Y that are both defined over the set W, is defined as,
SD(X,Y) , 1
2
∑
w∈W
|Pr[X = w]− Pr[Y = w]|.
We say X and Y are δ-close if SD(X,Y) ≤ δ. The min-entropy H∞(X) of a
random variable X← X is
H∞(X) = − log max
x∈X
Pr[X = x].
The (average) conditional min-entropy H˜∞(X|Z) of X conditioned on Z is de-
fined [9] as,
H˜∞(X|Z) = − log
(
EZ=z max
x
Pr[X = x|Z = z]
)
.
The following bound on the amount of information about one variable that can
leak through a correlated variable is proved in [9].
Lemma 1. [9]Let X← X and Z← Z with ` = log |Z|. Then
H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ H∞(X)− `.
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Definition 1. An (M,G, δ)-algebraic manipulation detection code, or (M,G, δ)-
AMD code for short, is a probabilistic encoding map Enc : M → G from a set
M of size M to an (additive) group G of order G, together with a deterministic
decoding function Dec : G → M⋃{⊥} such that Dec(Enc(m)) = m with prob-
ability 1 for any m ∈ M. The security of an AMD code requires that for any
m ∈M, ∆ ∈ G, Pr[Dec(Enc(m) +∆) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ.
The AMD code above is said to provide strong security. Weak AMD codes
provide security for randomly chosen messages. Efficiency of (M,G, δ)-AMD
codes is measured by the effective tag size which is defined as the minimum tag
length min{log2G} − u, where the minimum is over all (M,G, δ)-AMD codes
with M ≥ 2u. Concrete lengths are important in practice, and additionally, the
asymptotic rate (defined as the limit of the ratio of message length to codeword
length as the length grows to infinity) of both weak and strong AMD codes has
been shown [1] to be 1.
Lemma 2. [1] Any weak, respectively strong, (M,G, δ)-AMD code satisfies
G ≥ M − 1
δ
+ 1, respectively, G ≥ M − 1
δ2
+ 1.
The following construction is optimal with respect to effective tag size.
Construction 1 [1]: Let Fq be a field of size q and characteristic p, and let d
be any integer such that d+ 2 is not divisible by p. Define the encoding function,
Enc : Fdq → Fdq×Fq×Fq,m 7→ (m, r, f(r,m)), where f(r,m) = rd+2+
d∑
i=1
mir
i.
The decoder Dec verifies a tagged message (m, r, t) by comparing t = f(r,m)
and outputs m if agree; ⊥ otherwise. (Enc,Dec) gives a (qd, qd+2, d+1q )-AMD
code.
Definition 2 (strong LLR-AMD). [2] A randomized code with encoding func-
tion Enc : M × R → X and decoding function Dec : X → M⋃{⊥} is a
(M,X, |R|, α, δ)-strong LLR-AMD code if for any m ∈ M and any r ∈ R,
Dec(Enc(m, r)) = m, and for any adversary A and variables R $← R and Z
such that H˜∞(R|Z) ≥ (1− α) log |R|, it holds for any m ∈M:
Pr[Dec(Enc(m,R) + A(Z)) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ, (1)
where the probability is over the randomness of encoding.
Definition 3 (weak LLR-AMD). [2] A deterministic code with encoding func-
tion Enc :M→ X and decoding function Dec : X →M⋃{⊥} is a (M,X,α, δ)-
weak LLR-AMD code if for any m ∈ M, Dec(Enc(m)) = m, and for any ad-
versary A and variables M←M and Z such that H˜∞(M|Z) ≥ (1−α) log |M|,
it holds:
Pr[Dec(Enc(M) + A(Z)) /∈ {M,⊥}] ≤ δ, (2)
where the probability is over the randomness of the message.
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In the above two definitions, leakages are from randomness (bounded by H˜∞(R|Z)
≥ (1−α) log |R|) and message space (bounded by H˜∞(M|Z) ≥ (1−α) log |M|),
respectively.
Wiretap II codes.
Wiretap II model [5] of secure communication considers a scenario where Alice
wants to send messages to Bob over a reliable channel that is eavesdropped by an
adversary, Eve. The adversary can read a fraction ρ of the transmitted codeword
components, and is allowed to choose any subset (the right size) of their choice. A
wiretap II code provides information-theoretic secrecy for message transmission
against this adversary.
Definition 4. A (ρ, ε) wiretap II code, or (ρ, ε)-WtII code for short, is a proba-
bilistic encoding function Enc : Fkq → Fnq , together with a deterministic decoding
function Dec : Fnq → Fkq such that Dec(Enc(m)) = m for any m ∈ Fkq . The
security of a (ρ, ε)-WtII code requires that for any m0,m1 ∈ Fkq , any S ⊂ [n] of
size |S| ≤ nρ,
SD(Enc(m0)|S ; Enc(m1)|S) ≤ ε (3)
A rate R is achievable if there exists a family of (ρ, ε)-WtII codes with encoding
and decoding functions {Encn,Decn} such that limn→∞ kn = R.
The above definition of security is in line with [8] and is stronger than the original
definition [5], and also the definition in [10].
Lemma 3. [8] The achievable rate of (ρ, 0)-WtII codes is upper bounded by 1−ρ.
When ε = 0 is achieved in (3), the distribution of any ρ fraction of the code-
word components is independent of the message. This is achieved, for example,
by the following construction of wiretap II codes.
Construction 2 [5] Let G(n−k)×n be a generator matrix of a [n, n − k] MDS
code over Fq. Append k rows to G such that the obtained matrix
[
G
G˜
]
is non-
singular. Define the encoder WtIIenc as follows.
WtIIenc(m) = [r,m]
[
G
G˜
]
, where r
$← Fn−kq .
WtIIdec uses a parity-check matrix Hk×n of the MDS code to first compute the
syndrome, HxT , and then map the syndrome back to the message using the one-
to-one correspondence between syndromes and messages. The above construction
gives a family of (ρ, 0)-WtII codes for ρ = n−kn .
3 AMD codes for leaky storage
We consider codes over a finite field Fq, where q is a prime power, and assume
message set M = Fkq and the storage stores an element of the group G = Fnq .
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3.1 Definition of ρ-AMD
Definition 5. An (n, k)-coding scheme consists of two functions: a randomized
encoding function Enc : Fkq → Fnq , and deterministic decoding function Dec :
Fnq → Fkq ∪ {⊥}, satisfying Pr[Dec(Enc(m)) = m] = 1, for any m ∈ Fkq . Here
probability is taken over the randomness of the encoding algorithm.
The information rate of an (n, k)-coding scheme is kn .
We now define our leakage model and codes that detect manipulation in
presence of this leakage. Let X = Enc(m) for a message m ∈ M, and AZ
denote an adversary with access to a variable Z, representing the leakage of
information about the codeword.
Definition 6 (ρ-AMD ). An (n, k)-coding scheme is called a strong ρ-AMD
code with security parameter δ if Pr[Dec(AZ(Enc(m))) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ for
any message m ∈ Fkq and adversary AZ whose leakage variable Z satisfies
H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ H∞(X) − ρn log q, and is allowed to choose any offset vector in
Fnq to add to the codeword.
The code is called a weak ρ-AMD code if security holds for M
$← Fkq (rather than
an arbitrary message distribution). The encoder in this case is deterministic and
the probability of outputing a different message is over the randomness of the
message.
A family {(Encn,Decn)} of ρ-AMD codes is a set of (n, k(n))-coding schemes
indexed by the codeword length n, where for any value of δ, there is an N ∈ N
such that for all n ≥ N , (Encn,Decn) is a ρ-AMD code with security parameter
δ.
A rate R is achievable if there exists a family {(Encn,Decn)} of ρ-AMD codes
such that limn→∞
k(n)
n = R as δ approaches 0
Our definition bounds the amount of leakage in comparison with an adver-
sary who observes up to ρn components of the stored codeword. We call this
latter adversary a Limited-View (LV) adversary [3]. According to Lemma 1, the
min-entropy of the stored codeword given an LV-adversary will be H˜∞(X|Z) ≥
H∞(X)− ρn log q. We require the same min-entropy be left in the codeword, for
an arbitrary leakage variable Z accessible to the adversary.
Fig. 1. The arrow shows the part of the system that leaks.
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Fig. 1 shows places of leakage in AMD encoding in our model, and the models
in Definition 2 and Definition 3.
Proposition 1. Let X denote a random variable representing the codeword of
a message m (M for weak codes), and Z denote the leakage variable of the
adversary AZ who uses the leakage information to construct the best offset vector
to make the decoder output a different message. For a ρ-AMD code with security
parameter δ, we have H˜(X|Z) ≥ log 1δ .
Proof. We write the proof for strong ρ-AMD codes. (The proof for weak ρ-AMD
codes follows similarly.) According to the security definition of ρ-AMD codes,
we have
Pr[Dec(AZ(X)) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ,
where the probability is over the randomness of X, and is the expectation over
z ∈ Z. If the adversary with the leakage variable Z = z can correctly guess the
value x of X, then a codeword x′ corresponding to another message m′ can be
constructed to cause the decoder to output m′, by using Az(X) = X + (x′−x).
We then have
Pr[Dec(AZ(X)) /∈ {m,⊥}|Z = z] ≥ max
x
Pr[X = x|Z = z],
which by taking expectation over z ∈ Z yields
Ez (Pr[Dec(AZ(X)) /∈ {m,⊥}|Z = z]) ≥ Ez
(
max
x
Pr[X = x|Z = z]
)
= 2−H˜(X|Z),
The last equality follows from the definition of conditional min-entropy. The
desired inequality then follows directly from the security definition of ρ-AMD
codes as follows.
2−H˜(X|Z) ≤ Pr[Dec(AZ(X)) /∈ {m,⊥}|Z = z] ≤ δ ⇐⇒ H˜(X|Z) ≥ log 1
δ
.
uunionsq
Definition 7. Let C denote the set of codewords of a code, and Cm denote the
set of codewords corresponding to the message m, i.e. Cm = {Enc(m, r)|r ∈ R}.
A randomised encoder is called regular if |Cm| = |R| for all m.
We note that because the code has zero decoding error when there is no adversary
corruption, we have
Cm ∩ Cm′ = ∅, ∀m,m′ ∈M. (4)
This means that for regular randomised encoders, a codeword uniquely deter-
mines a pair (m, r). Assuming that the randomized encoder uses r uniformly
distributed bits, the random variable X = Enc(m,R) is flat over Cm.
Lemma 4. The relations between Strong LLR-AMD codes and strong ρ-AMD
codes are as follows.
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1. If there exists a regular randomized encoder for a (qk, qn, 2r, α, δ)-strong
LLR-AMD code, then there is an encoder for strong ρ-AMD code with secu-
rity parameter δ and leakage parameter ρ where ρ ≤ αrn log q .
2. If there exists a regular randomized encoder for a strong ρ-AMD code with
security parameter δ and leakage parameter ρ, then there is an encoder for a
(qk, qn, 2r, α, δ)-strong LLR-AMD code with α and r where α ≤ nρ log qr and
r ≥ log 1δ + nρ log q.
Proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix A.
In [2], it is shown that the optimal AMD code in Construction 1 gives a
(qd, qd+2, q, α, d+1q1−α )-strong LLR-AMD code. The parameters of this LLR-AMD
code are k = d, n = d + 2, r = log q and δ = d+1q1−α . A simple mathematical
manipulation of these equations gives α = 1 − logq n−1δ , and substituting them
into Lemma 4, item 1, we obtain
ρ ≤ (1− logq
n−1
δ ) log q
n log q
=
1− logq n−1δ
n
.
This results in the following.
Corollary 1. The code in Construction 1 is a strong ρ-AMD code with k = d,
n = d+ 2, security parameter δ and leakage parameter ρ ≤ 1−logq
n−1
δ
n .
It is easy to see that ρ < 1n . Thus the resulting construction of strong ρ-AMD
codes can only tolerate a very small leakage. Moreover the upper bound on ρ
vanishes as n goes to infinity and so this construction cannot give a non-trivial
family of strong ρ-AMD code. We note that the same construction resulted in a
family of strong LLR-AMD codes with asymptotic rate 1.
Lemma 5. The relations between weak LLR-AMD codes and weak ρ-AMD codes
are as follows.
1. A (qk, qn, α, δ)-weak LLR-AMD code is a weak ρ-AMD code with security
parameter δ and leakage parameter ρ satisfying ρ ≤ αkn .
2. A weak ρ-AMD code with security parameter δ and leakage parameter ρ is a
(qk, qn, α, δ)-weak LLR-AMD code satisfying α ≤ ρnk .
Proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix B.
A construction of (qd, qd+1, α, 2
q1−αd ) weak LLR-AMD codes is given in [2,
Theorem 2]. The code has parameters k = d, n = d+ 1 and δ = 2
q1−αd . A simple
mathematical manipulation of these equations gives α =
1−logq 2δ
n−1 , and so from
Lemma 5, item 1, we obtain
ρ ≤ (
1−logq 2δ
n−1 )(n− 1)
n
=
1− logq 2δ
n
.
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Corollary 2. The code in [2, Theorem 2] is a weak ρ-AMD code with k = d,
n = d+ 1, security parameter δ and leakage parameter ρ ≤ 1−logq 2δn .
This construction gives ρ-AMD codes with small ρ, and cannot be used to con-
struct a family of ρ-AMD codes for ρ > 0.
3.2 Efficiency bounds for ρ-AMD codes
Theorem 1. If an (n, k)-coding scheme is a strong ρ-AMD code with security
parameter δ, then,
k ≤ n(1− ρ) + 2 log δ − 1
log q
. (5)
The achievable rate of strong ρ-AMD codes is upper bounded by 1− ρ.
Proof. Consider a strong ρ-AMD code with security parameter δ. By Proposition
1, H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ log 1δ should hold for any Z satisfying H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ H∞(X) −
ρn log q. In particular, the inequality should hold for Z such that H˜∞(X|Z) =
H∞(X)− ρn log q. We then have H∞(X)− ρn log q ≥ log 1δ . On the other hand,
we always have log |Cm| ≥ H∞(X), where Cm denotes the set of codewords
corresponding to message m, which is the support of X. This gives the following
lower bound on |Cm|.
|Cm| ≥
2ρn log q
δ
=
qρn
δ
. (6)
Now consider the adversary randomly choose an offset ∆ 6= 0n, we have
δ ≥ Pr[Enc(m) +∆ ∈ ∪m′ 6=mEm′ ]
≥ |
⋃
m′ 6=mEm′ |
|Fnq | − 1
(4),(6)
≥ (q
k − 1) · qρnδ
qn − 1 .
(7)
Therefore,
k ≤ n(1− ρ) + 2 log δ − 1
log q
.
uunionsq
Proposition 2. If an (n, k)-coding scheme is a weak ρ-AMD code with security
parameter δ, then qρn−k ≤ δ and qk−1qn−1 ≤ δ.
Proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix C.
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4 Limited-View ρ-AMD codes
We consider a special type of leakage where the adversary chooses a subset
S, |S| = ρn (n is the codeword length), and the codeword components associ-
ated with this set will be revealed to them. The adversary will then use this
information to construct their offset vector. A tampering strategy is a function
from Fnq to Fnq which can be described by the notation fS,g, where S ⊂ [n] and
a function g : Fnρq → Fnq , with the following interpretation. The set S specifies
a subset of ρn indexes of the codeword that the adversary choose. The function
g determines an offset for each read value on the subset S. A ρLV -AMD code
provides protection against all adversary strategies. (This approach to defining
tampering functions is inspired by Non-Malleable Codes (NMC) [11].)
Let S [nρ] be the set of all subsets of [n] of size nρ. Let M(Fnρq ,Fnq ) denote
the set of all functions from Fnρq to Fnq , namely, M(Fnρq ,Fnq ) := {g : Fnρq → Fnq }.
Definition 8 (Faddρ ). The class of tampering function Faddρ , consists of the set
of functions Fnq → Fnq , that can be described by two parameters, S ∈ S [nρ] and
g ∈M(Fnρq ,Fnq ). The set Faddρ of limited view algebraic tampering functions are
defined as follows.
Faddρ =
{
fS,g(x) | S ∈ S [nρ], g ∈M(Fnρq ,Fnq )
}
, (8)
where fS,g(x) = x + g(x|S) for x ∈ Fnq .
Definition 9 (ρLV -AMD ). An (n, k)-coding scheme is called a strong ρLV -
AMD code with security parameter δ if Pr[Dec(f(Enc(m))) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ for
any message m ∈ Fkq and any fS,g ∈ Faddρ . It is called a weak ρLV -AMD code if
it only requires the security to hold for a random message M← Fkq rather than
an arbitrary message m.
We first give a generic construction of strong ρLV -AMD codes from WtII
codes and AMD codes.
Construction 3 Let (AMDenc,AMDdec) be a (qk, qn
′
, δ)-AMD code and let
(WtIIenc,WtIIdec) be a linear (ρ, 0)-wiretap II code with encoder WtIIenc :
Fn′q → Fnq . Then (Enc,Dec) defined as follows is a strong ρLV -AMD codes with
security parameter δ.{
Enc(m) = WtIIenc(AMDenc(m));
Dec(x) = AMDdec(WtIIdec(x)).
When instantiated with the (qk, qk+2, k+1q )-AMD code in Construction 1 and
the linear (ρ, 0)-wiretap II code in Construction 2, we obtain a family of strong
ρLV -AMD codes with security parameter k+1q that achieves rate 1− ρ.
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Fig. 2. WtII◦AMD construction with Aim denoting the values of AMDenc(m)
Proof. Since both AMDenc and WtIIenc are randomised encoders, in this proof
we write the randomness of a randomized encoder explicitly. Let I denote the
randomness of AMDenc and let J denote the randomness of WtIIenc. As illus-
trated in Fig. 2, a message m is first encoded into an AMD codeword AIm =
AMDenc(m, I). The AMD codeword AIm is then further encoded into a WtII
codeword, which is the final ρLV -AMD codeword: Enc(m) = WtIIenc(AIm, J).
According to (3), SD
(
WtIIenc(Ai1m, J)|S ; WtIIenc(A
i2
m, J)|S
)
= 0. This says that
AIm and Enc(m)|S are independent random variables, in particular, I and Enc(m)|S
are independent. According to Definition 9, to show that (Enc,Dec) is a strong
ρLV -AMD code with security parameter δ, we need to show that for any mes-
sage m, and any fS,g ∈ Faddρ , Pr[Dec(fS,g(Enc(m))) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ, where the
probability is over the randomness (I,J) of the encoder Enc. We show this in
two steps.
Step 1. In this step, we assume that Enc(m)|S = a has occurred and bound
the error probability of (Enc,Dec) under this condition. We compute
Pr[Dec(fS,g(Enc(m))) /∈ {m,⊥}|(Enc(m)|S = a)]
= Pr[Dec(Enc(m) + g(a)) /∈ {m,⊥}|(Enc(m)|S = a)]
= Pr[AMDdec(WtIIdec(WtIIenc(AMDenc(m, I),J) + g(a))) /∈ {m,⊥}
|(Enc(m)|S = a)]
= Pr[AMDdec(AMDenc(m, I) + WtIIdec(g(a))) /∈ {m,⊥}|(Enc(m)|S = a)]
= Pr[AMDdec(AMDenc(m, I) + WtIIdec(g(a))) /∈ {m,⊥}],
≤ δ,
where the third equality follows from the linearity of (WtIIenc,WtIIdec), the last
equality follows from the fact that I and Enc(m)|S are independent discussed in
the beginning of the proof, and the inequality follows trivially from the security
of (AMDenc,AMDdec).
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Step 2. In this step, we conclude the first part of the proof by showing
Pr[Dec(fS,g(Enc(m))) /∈ {m,⊥}]
=
∑
a Pr[Enc(m)|S = a] · Pr[Dec(fS,g(Enc(m))) /∈ {m,⊥}|(Enc(m)|S = a)]
≤∑a Pr[Enc(m)|S = a] · δ
= δ,
where the inequality follows from Step 1.
Finally, the rate of the (ρ, 0)-wiretap II code in Construction 2 is k+2n = 1−ρ.
So the asymptotic rate of the strong ρLV -AMD code family is
lim
n→∞
k
n
= lim
n→∞
(1− ρ)n− 2
n
= 1− ρ.
uunionsq
We next show a construction of weak ρLV -AMD codes that achieves asymp-
totic rate 1.
Construction 4 Let Fq be a finite field of q elements. Let G be a k × k non-
singular matrix over Zq−1 such that each column of G consists of distinct entries,
i.e., gi,j 6= gi′ ,j for any j and i 6= i
′
. Assume the entries of G (viewed as inte-
gers) is upper-bounded by ψk for constant ψ, i.e., gi,j ≤ ψk. Then the following
construction gives a family of weak LV-AMD codes of asymptotic rate 1 with any
leakage parameter ρ < 1.
Enc1 : (F∗q)k → (F∗q)k × Fq : m 7→ (m||f(m, G)),
where F∗q denotes the set of non-zero elements of Fq and the tag f(m, G) is
generated as follows.
f(m, G) =
k∑
j=1
k∏
i=1
m
gi,j
i . (9)
The decoder dec checks if the first k-tuple of the input vector, when used in 9,
match the last component.
The proof of Construction 4 is given in Appendix D.
Concrete constructions of the matrix G can be found in [2, Remark 2].
5 Applications
5.1 Robust Ramp SSS
A Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) consists of two algorithms (Share,Recover). The
algorithm Share maps a secret s ∈ S to a vector S = (S1, . . . , SN ) where the
1 The message distribution in this construction is not exactly uniform over Fkq but
(F∗q)k. So this construction can achieve security even when the message distribution
is not uniform.
Detecting Algebraic Manipulation in Leaky Storage Systems 15
shares Si are in some set Si and will be given to participant Pi. The algorithm
Recover takes as input a vector of shares S˜ = (S˜1, . . . , S˜N ) where S˜i ∈ Si
⋃{⊥},
where ⊥ denotes an absent share. For a (t,N)-threshold SSS, t shares reveal no
information about the secret s and t + 1 shares uniquely recover the secret s.
For a (t, r,N)-ramp SSS [7] with (Sharersss,Recoverrsss) as sharing and recover-
ing algorithms, the access structure is specified by two thresholds. The privacy
threshold is t, and the reconstruction threshold is r. In a (t, r,N)-ramp SSS,
subsets of t or less shares do not reveal any information about the secret, and
subsets of r or more shares can uniquely recover the secret s. A set of shares of
size t < a < r may leak some information about the secret. In particular, we
consider ramp schemes in which a set of t + α(r − t) shares leak α fraction of
secret information.
Definition 10 ((t, r,N)-Ramp Secret Sharing Scheme). A (t, r,N)-ramp
secret sharing scheme is consist of a pair of algorithms (Sharersss,Recoverrsss),
where Sharersss randomly maps a secret s ∈ S to a share vector S = (S1, · · · , SN )
and Recoverrsss deterministically reconstruct a s˜ ∈ S or output ⊥, satisfy the
following.
– Privacy: The adversary can access up to r − 1 shares. If the number of
shares accessed by the adversary is a ≤ t, no information will be leaked
about the secret. If the number of leaked share is a = t + α(r − t), where
0 < α < 1, then H˜∞(S|Si1 · · ·Sia) ≥ H∞(S) − α log |S| 2 , for S ← S and
any {i1, · · · , ia} ⊂ [N ].
– Reconstruction: Any r correct shares can reconstruct the secret s.
A linear ramp SSS has the additional property that the Recover function is
linear, namely, for any s ∈ G, any share vector S of s, and any vector S′ (possibly
containing some ⊥ symbols), we have Recoverrsss(S + S′) = s + Recoverrsss(S′),
where vector addition is defined element-wise and addition with ⊥ is defined by
⊥ +x = x+ ⊥=⊥ for all x. In a linear SSS, the adversary can modify the shares
S˜i = Si+∆i, such that the difference ∆ = s˜−s between the reconstructed secret
and the shared secret, is known.
In a (t,N, δ)-robust SSS, for any t+ 1 shares with at most t shares modified
by the adversary, the reconstruction algorithm can recover the secret s, or de-
tect the adversarial modification and output ⊥, with probability at least 1 − δ
[1]. That is with probability at most δ the secret is either not recoverable, or
a wrong secret is accepted. A modular construction of the robust SSS using an
AMD code and a linear SSS is given by Cramer et al. [1].
We define robust ramp secret sharing scheme when the adversary can adap-
tively corrupt up to t + ρ(r − t) shares, where 0 < ρ < 1 is a constant (level of
robustness against active adversaries).
2 This definition of leakage is seemingly different from [13], where uniform distribution
of secret S is assumed and Shannon entropy is used instead of min-entropy.
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Definition 11 ((t, r,N, ρ, δ)-Robust Ramp Secret Sharing Scheme). A
(t, r,N, ρ, δ)-robust ramp secret sharing scheme is consist of a pair of algorithms
(Sharerrsss,Recoverrrsss), where Sharerrsss randomly maps a secret s ∈ S to a share
vector S = (S1, · · · , SN ) and Recoverrrsss deterministically reconstruct a s˜ ∈ S or
output ⊥, satisfy the following.
– Privacy: The adversary can access up to r − 1 shares. If the number of
shares accessed by the adversary is a ≤ t, no information will be leaked
about the secret. If the number of leaked share is a = t + α(r − t), where
0 < α < 1, then H˜∞(S|Si1 · · ·Sia) ≥ H∞(S)− α log |S|, for S ← S and any
{i1, · · · , ia} ⊂ [N ].
– Reconstruction: Any r correct shares can reconstruct the secret s.
– Robustness: For any r shares with at most t + ρ(r − t) corrupted shares,
the probability that either the secret is correctly reconstructed, or the the
adversary’s modifications being detected, is at least 1− δ.
We propose a general construction of robust ramp secret sharing scheme
using a ρamd-AMD and (t, r,N)-ramp secret sharing scheme.
Theorem 2. Consider a linear (t, r,N)-ramp secret sharing scheme with the
algorithm pair (Sharersss,Recoverrsss) and shares Si ∈ Fmq , i = 1, · · · , N , and
let (Enc,Dec) be a ρamd-AMD code Fkq → Fnq , with failure probability δamd and
n = (r − t)m. Then there is a robust ramp secret sharing scheme with algo-
rithm pair (Sharerrsss,Recoverrrsss) given by Sharerrsss(s) = Sharersss(Enc(s)) and
Recoverrrsss(S˜) = Dec(Recoverrsss(S˜)) is a (t, r,N, ρ, δ)-Robust Ramp Secret Shar-
ing Scheme with ρ ≤ ρamd and δ ≤ δamd.
Proof. First, we show that if the adversary reads at most t+ρ(r− t) shares, the
ρamd-AMD codeword c leaks at most ρn log q informations. Since the ρamd-AMD
codeword is encoded by a (t, r,N) ramp secret sharing scheme, t shares will not
leak any information about the ρamd-AMD codeword c. Given that the share size
|Si| ≤ qm and n = (r − t)m, the leakage of the extra ρ(r − t) shares will leak at
most ρn log q bit of information about the ρamd-AMD codeword c.
Second, we show that the resulting secret sharing scheme is δ-robust. For
a secret s, let S ← Sharerrsss(s) be the original share vector and S˜ be the cor-
rupted one, and let S
′
= S˜ − S. For any r shares, the failure probability of the
reconstruction is given by,
Pr[Recoverrrsss(S˜) /∈ {s,⊥}] (1)= Pr[Dec(Recoverrsss(S) + Recoverrsss(S′)) /∈ {s,⊥}]
= Pr[Dec(Enc(s) +∆) /∈ {s,⊥}],
where ∆ = Recoverrsss(S
′
) is chosen by the adversary A, and (1) uses the linearity
of the ramp scheme. In choosing ∆, the adversary A can use at most ρ fraction
of information in the ρamd-AMD codeword c = Enc(s). Since at most ρn log q
information bit is leaked to the adversary, that is H˜∞(C|Z) ≥ H∞(C)−ρn log q,
from the definition of ρamd-AMD code with ρ ≤ ρamd, the decoding algorithm
Dec outputs correct secret s, or detects the error ⊥, with probability at least
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1− δamd. This means that the ramp secret sharing scheme is robust and outputs
either the correct secret, or detects the adversarial tampering, with probability
at most 1 − δ ≥ 1 − δamd. Thus a (t, r,N)-ramp secret sharing scheme and a
ρamd-AMD with security parameter δamd, give a (t, r,N, ρ, δ)-robust ramp secret
sharing scheme with δ ≤ δamd and ρ ≤ ρamd. uunionsq
5.2 Wiretap II with Algebraic Adversary
The Wiretap II [5] problem considers a passive adversary that can read a ρ
fraction of the codeword components and the goal is to prevent the adversary
from learning information about the sent message. Wiretap II with an active ad-
versary has been considered in [14] and later generalized in [15,8]. In this latter
general model, called Adversarial Wiretap (AWTP) mode, the adversary is char-
acterized by two parameters ρr and ρw, denoting the fraction of the codeword
components the adversary can “read” and “modify additively ”, respectively.
The goal is two-fold: to prevent the adversary from obtaining any information
(secrecy) and, to recover the message despite the changes made by the adversary
(reliability). It was proved [8] that in AWTP model, where the adversary can
write to a ρw fraction of the codeword components additively, secure and reliable
communication is possible if, ρr + ρw < 1. This says that when ρr + ρw > 1,
one can only hope for weaker type of security, for example, secrecy and error
detection. We consider wiretap II with an algebraic adversary, who can read a ρ
fraction of the codeword components and tamper with the whole codeword alge-
braically, namely, adding a non-zero group element to the codeword (codewords
are assumed to live in a group). The adversary in this model is equivalent to the
AWTP adversary with ρr = ρ and ρw = 1. But the coding goal of wiretap II
with an algebraic adversary is different from AWTP.
Definition 12. An algebraic tampering wiretap II channel is a communication
channel between Alice and Bob that is (partially) controlled by an adversary Eve
with two following two capabilities.
– Read: Eve adaptively selects a fraction ρ of the components of the transmitted
codeword c = c1, · · · , cn to read, namely, Eve’s knowledge of the transmitted
codeword is given by Z = {ci1 , · · · , ciρn}, where S = {i1, · · · , iρn} ⊂ [n] is
chosen by Eve.
– Write: Assume c ∈ G for some additive group G. Eve chooses an “off-set”
∆ ∈ G according to Z and add it to the codeword c, namely, the channel
outputs c +∆.
Definition 13 ((ρ, , δ)-algebraic tampering wiretap II ((ρ, , δ)-AWtII)).
A (ρ, , δ)-AWtII code is a coding scheme (Enc,Dec) that guarantees the following
two properties.
– Secrecy: For any pair of messages m0 and m1, any S ⊂ [n] of size |S| ≤ nρ,
(3) should hold, namely,
SD(Enc(m0)|S ; Enc(m1)|S) ≤ ε.
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– Robustness: If the adversary is passive, Dec always outputs the correct mes-
sage. If the adversary is active, the probability that the decoder outputs a
wrong message is bounded by δ. That is, for any message m and any ρ-
algebraic tampering wiretap II adversary A,
Pr[Dec(A(Enc(m))) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ.
The secrecy of (ρ, , δ)-AWtII code implies that a (ρ, , δ)-AWtII code is a
(ρ, )-WtII code. The following rate upper bound follows directly from Lemma
3.
Corollary 3. The rate of (ρ, 0, δ)-AWtII codes is bounded by R ≤ 1− ρ.
The robustness property of (ρ, , δ)-AWtII code is the same as the secu-
rity of a strong ρLV -AMD code (see Definition 9). Furthermore, the construc-
tion of ρLV -AMD codes in Construction 3 uses a (ρ, 0)-WtII code to encode
c = AMDenc(m), which guarantees secrecy with respect to any pair of (c0, c1),
and hence secrecy with respect to any pair of (m0,m1). These assert that Con-
struction 3 yields a family of (ρ, 0, δ)-AWtII codes.
Corollary 4. There exists a family of (ρ, 0, δ)-AWtII codes that achieves rate
R = 1− ρ.
6 Conclusion
We considered an extension of AMD codes when the storage leaks information
and the amount of leaked information is bounded by ρ log |G|. We defined ρ-
AMD codes that provide protection in this scenario, both with weak and strong
security, and derived concrete and asymptotic bounds on the efficiency of codes
in these settings. Table 1 compares our results with original AMD codes and
an earlier work (called LLR-AMD) that allow leakage in specific parts of the
encoding process. Unlike LLR-AMD that uses different leakage requirements
for the weak and strong case, we use a single model to express the leakage
and require that the left-over entropy of the codeword be lower bounded. This
makes our analysis and constructions more challenging. In particular, optimal
constructions of LLR-AMD codes follow directly from the optimal constructions
of original AMD codes. However constructing optimal ρ-AMD code, in both weak
and strong model, remain open. We gave an explicit construction of a family of
codes with respect to a weaker notion of leakage (ρLV -AMD ) whose rate achieves
the upper bounds of the ρ-AMD codes. We finally gave two applications of the
codes to robust ramp secret sharing schemes and algebraic manipulation wiretap
II channel.
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Assume a regular encoder and consider a message m.
The codeword X = Enc(m,R) where the randomness of encoding R is a uni-
formly distributed r-bit string. Now consider an adversary with leakage variable
Z. Because of the one-to-one property of the regular encoder, we have
H∞(X) = H∞(R) = r, (10)
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and
H˜∞(X|Z) = − logEz (maxx Pr[X = x|Z = z])
= − logEz (maxr Pr[R = r|Z = z])
= H˜∞(R|Z).
(11)
For a leakage variable Z, we consider two classes of adversaries denoted by
AZ and BZ , depending on the conditions that they must satisfy, as follows:
AZ() is an adversary whose leakage variable must satisfy a lower bound on
H˜∞(R|Z) and, BZ() is an adversary whose leakage variable must satisfy a lower
bound on H˜∞(X|Z). Both adversaries, when applied to a vector x, use their
leakage variables to select an offset vector to be added to a codeword. That is
AZ(x) = x+∆z where ∆z ∈ Fnq is chosen dependent on the leakage Z = z. We
have the same definition for BZ(x) = x+∆z.
i. strong LLR-AMD code ⇒ strong ρ-AMD
Now consider a (qk, qn, 2r, α, δ)-strong LLR-AMD code C with encoder and
decoder pair, (Enc,Dec). For an adversary AZ whose leakage variable satisfies
H˜∞(R|Z) ≥ (1− α)r, we have
Pr[Dec(AZ(Enc(m,R))) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ,
where the probability is over the randomness of encoding, and is an expectation
over z ∈ Z.
Note that using (10) and (11), the AZ adversary is also a BZ adversary
satisfying,
H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ H˜∞(X)− αr (12)
Both these adversaries have the same leakage variable Z and so any algorithm
Offset(z) used by one, taking the value Z = z as input and finding the the
offset ∆z, can be used by the other also (the two adversaries have the same
information). This means that the success probabilities of the two adversaries
are the same,
Pr[Dec(AZ(Enc(m,R))) /∈ {m,⊥}] = Pr[Dec(BZ(Enc(m,R))) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ.
For ρ-AMD codes, security is defined against a BZ adversary whose leakage
variable Z satisfies,
H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ H∞(X)− ρn log q (13)
Comparing (13) and (12), we conclude that C is a ρ-AMD code for ρ values that
satisfy αr ≥ ρn log q, namely ρ ≤ αrn log q .
ii. strong ρ-AMD ⇒ strong LLR-AMD code
An argument similar to i. immediately gives that the (qk, qn, 2r, α, δ)-strong
LLR-AMD code obtain from ρ-AMD code should satisfy α ≤ ρn log qr . Next we
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show the bound on r follows from Proposition 1 together with (10). Indeed, by
Proposition 1, H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ log 1δ should hold for any Z satisfying H˜∞(X|Z) ≥
H∞(X)− ρn log q. In particular, we must have H∞(X)− ρn log q ≥ log 1δ . Now
we can use (10) to conclude that r ≥ log 1δ + ρn log q. uunionsq
B Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. The encoder Enc is a one-to-one correspondence between messages and
codewords. Consider a message variable M ← M (in particular, the uniform
distribution is emphasized by Mu
$← M). The codeword is a variable X =
Enc(M). Now consider an adversary with leakage variable Z. Because of the
one-to-one property of the encoder, we have
H∞(X) = H∞(M), (14)
and
H˜∞(X|Z) = − logEz (maxx Pr[X = x|Z = z])
= − logEz (maxm Pr[M = m|Z = z])
= H˜∞(M|Z).
(15)
For a leakage variable Z, we consider two classes of adversaries denoted by
AZ and BZ , depending on the conditions that they must satisfy, as follows:
AZ() is an adversary whose leakage variable must satisfy a lower bound on
H˜∞(M|Z) and, BZ() is an adversary whose leakage variable must satisfy a lower
bound on H˜∞(X|Z). Both adversaries, when applied to a vector x, use their
leakage variables to select an offset vector to be added to a codeword. That is
AZ(x) = x+∆z where ∆z ∈ Fnq is chosen dependent on the leakage Z = z. We
have the same definition for BZ(x) = x+∆z.
i. weak LLR-AMD code ⇒ weak ρ-AMD
Now consider a (qk, qn, α, δ)-weak LLR-AMD code C with encoder and de-
coder pair, (Enc,Dec). For an adversary AZ whose leakage variable satisfies
H˜∞(M|Z) ≥ (1− α)k log q, we have
Pr[Dec(AZ(Enc(M))) /∈ {M,⊥}] ≤ δ,
where the probability is over the randomness of encoding, and is an expectation
over z ∈ Z.
Note that using (14) and (15), the AZ adversary is also a BZ adversary
satisfying,
H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ (1− α)k log q (16)
Both these adversaries have the same leakage variable Z and so any algorithm
Offset(z) used by one, taking the value Z = z as input and finding the the
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offset ∆z, can be used by the other also (the two adversaries have the same
information). This means that the success probabilities of the two adversaries
are the same,
Pr[Dec(AZ(Enc(M))) /∈ {M,⊥}] = Pr[Dec(BZ(Enc(Mu))) /∈ {Mu,⊥}] ≤ δ.
For ρ-AMD codes, security is defined against a BZ adversary whose leakage
variable Z satisfies,
H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ H∞(X)− ρn log q, where X = Enc(Mu). (17)
Comparing (17) and (16), we conclude that C is a ρ-AMD code for ρ values that
satisfy αk ≥ ρn, namely ρ ≤ αkn .
ii. weak ρ-AMD ⇒ weak LLR-AMD code
An argument similar to i. immediately gives that the (qk, qn, α, δ)-weak LLR-
AMD code obtain from ρ-AMD code should satisfy α ≤ ρnk . uunionsq
C Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. By Proposition 1, H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ log 1δ should hold for any Z satisfying
H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ H∞(X)−ρn log q. In particular, we must have H∞(X)−ρn log q ≥
log 1δ . Since the message M of weak ρ-AMD is uniform and the encoder is one-
to-one correspondence, H∞(X) = H∞(M) = k log q. We conclude that k log q −
ρn log q ≥ log 1δ , namely,
qρn−k ≤ δ. (18)
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we also consider a random attack strategy.
Then the total number of valid codewords that do not decode to M is at least
(qk−1), which is the number of offsets that lead to undetected manipulations. A
randomly chosen offset (∆ 6= 0n) leads to undetected manipulation with proba-
bility at most
qk − 1
qn − 1
and we must have
qk − 1
qn − 1 ≤ δ. (19)
uunionsq
D Proof of Construction 4
Proof. Let β be a primitive element of Fq. Then every element mi ∈ F∗q can be
written as a power of β: mi = β
m
′
i . (9) is rewritten as follows.
f(m, G) =
k∑
j=1
β
∑k
i=1m
′
igi,j mod (q−1).
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According to [2, Theorem 4] and the proof therein, (Enc,Dec) satisfies Pr[Dec(Enc(m)+
∆(Zρ)) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ ψkq−1 as long as the leakage parameter ρ satisfies k − (k +
1)ρ ≥ 1. What is left to show is for any ρ < 1 and δ > 0, there exists an N such
that for all k + 1 ≥ N , k − (k + 1)ρ > 0 and ψkq−1 ≤ δ are both satisfied. Indeed,
k− (k+ 1)ρ = k(1− ρ)− ρ, which is bigger than 1 if k > 1+ρ1−ρ . So we can simply
let N = d 1+ρ1−ρe + 1. And ψkq−1 ≤ δ can be achieved by choosing a big enough q,
for example, q = ω(ψk) and choose a big enough k. uunionsq
